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- Trade, Growth and Policy Reform Implications -
Introduction
Following the preferential trade agreement between
Spain and the European Economic Community of 1970, the
Spanish Government applied for full membership in the EEC
in July 1977. The official negotiations were formally
opened in February 1979; they are expected to lead to a
Treaty of Accession by 1982, with full integration four
or five years later. The acceptance and application by
Spain of the Common Market founding treaties and ensuing
legislation will presumably have noticeable repercussions
on the Spanish economy. This holds, above all, for both
its trade orientation and growth prospects.
The purpose of this paper is to examine those repercus-
sions and to discuss key economic, policies in Spain which
might be required if the country's entry into the ESC is to
have the desired effects. Since the effects of full integra-
tion will be greatly influenced by the present structural
characteristics of the Spanish economy, it may be instruc-
tive to begin with a brief overview of the long-term develop-
ment trends and a look at the performance in the recent years
since the end of the Franco regime (1975). Next, the potential
This paper has been presented at the 1979 Regional Meeting
of the Mont Pelerin Society, held in Madrid, 3-6 September
1979. It reports research on the economic implications of
the second EEC enlargement, being carried out by the Kiel
Institute of World Economics under the direction of Klaus-
Werner Schatz and the present author. I would like to thank
Christiane Krieger, Rolf-J. Langhammer, and Dean Spinanger
for research assistance.
The analysis focuses on industry only. For an overview of
Spain's economic prospects in an enlarged Community, see the
Spanish White Book prepared by the Circulo de Economia (1974)
A useful analysis is also provided by Musto (1977), whereas
the effects on the agricultural sector have recently been
analyzed by Solbes (1979).trade effects of Spain's integration into the Common Market
will be estimated. Some potential growth effects will be
considered subsequently. The last section will discuss
major policy implications.
Past and Current Economic Trends
The Spanish economy has experienced rapid growth and
a noticeable structural transformation since 1959, as can
be inferred from Table 1. Prior to 1959, the country has
undergone an autarkic economic development, with imports
limited by strong quantitative restrictions, traditional
agricultural exports stagnating, and much of manufactured
exports performing poorly. Following a severe stabiliza-
tion programme in 19 59, development policies were changed
from inward-looking towards more outward-looking, by
gradually liberalizing imports, reducing levels of effec-
tive protection, promoting manufactured exports and tourism,
and attracting private foreign investment.
During the sixties and early seventies, real gross
domestic product increased at an average annual rate of
7.5 percent.' This was a more rapid pace than what Spain
had experienced in any time of comparable length before in
this century; it also was among the highest rates within
the OECD countries and surpassed the rate of growth of the
EEC as a whole. Thus, while Spain's per capita income of
$ 341 in 1960 placed the country close to the wealthier
developing countries, by 1977 the per capita income of
$ 2,954 is well above the levels in non-oil LDCs and close
The section draws heavily on the author's earlier work
on industry and trade in Spain (1976) .
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all figures in the text have
been calculated from the annual reports and statistical
bulletins of the 3anco de Espana and the Banco de Bilbao.- 3 -



















































































































































Sources: World Bank, World Tables 1976. - Statistical Office of the European
Communities, Balance of Payments, 1970-77. - OECD, Main Economic
Indicators, April 1979. - OECD, National Accounts Statistics,
1952-1977, Vol. I. - Banco de Bilbao, Informe Economico, various
years.- 4 -
to Italy and Ireland. Although deep-seated structural
imbalances at the sectoral and regional level prevail,
anyone who had forecast in 1959 the performance of the
Spanish economy in the sixties and early seventies would
have been met only with scepticism.
Spain's outstanding growth performance was industry-
determined. Manufacturing value added has increased at a
rate slightly exceeding overall economic growth. In 1977,
its share in gross domestic product was almost 28 percent
(Table 1). Compared with an international cross-section
standard of reference, this share is roughly in line with
what one would have expected of a hypothetical country
with similar per capita income and population as Spain. At
the same time, the share of agriculture in GDP fell substan-
tially. During the sixties, industrialization in Spain
entered the stage of far-reaching vertical diversification.
Manufacturing activities now include, in addition to the
production of traditional consumer goods (such as food,
beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing, footwear, leather,
furniture, printed matter), a wide range of intermediate
and capital goods (such as basic metals, chemicals, electri-
cal equipment, machinery, ships, automobiles). Two of these
"new" branches - the automobile industry and the chemical
industry - were the most important contributors to manu-
facturing growth, certainly favoured by a massive inflow
of foreign capital and technologies.
Prior to 1959, the net inflow of private long-term
capital from abroad was almost negligible, reflecting the
antipathetic attitude of the Government towards foreign
investment as well as low profitability expectations in a
closed economy. After the official changes to an open-door
The 1977 figure is biased in an upward direction due to in-
flation. In prices and exchange rates of 1964, per capita
incomes were $ 455 and $ 1,105, respectively.- 5
posture, the presence of foreign capital has increased
strongly, with an annual average of $ 883 million during
the period 1959-78. The ratio of this inflow to the country's
gross fixed capital formation increased thereby from 3.4
to 11 percent, with implications for the allocation of
resources being probably larger than what is suggested by
these figures. Roughly one third of the capital inflow is
foreign direct investment, which has originated with 40
percent in the EEC and has been particularly strong in the
chemical, automobile, electrical, and food processing
industry, in addition to construction (Castane, 1973).
Until recently, foreign-controlled firms produced mainly
for the domestic market; nowadays they have become export-
oriented too (Munoz, 1978).
The policy of opening-up the economy has also led to
a strong expansion of manufactured exports (Donges, 1973).
Excluding (traditional) processed food products, their
value rose from #0.3 billion in 1959 to $ 9.4 billion in
1978 and their share in total exports increased from 35.5
,to 71.8 percent. Spanish manufacturers are exporting now,
on average, 21 percent of their output, as compared with
2 percent in 19 59. The export assortment not only includes
raw-material based and labour-intensive products, where
Spain used to have a comparative advantage; it also con-
sists, with an increasing weight, of standardized "product-
cycle" goods, which can be regarded as indication of the
country's potential to diversify her export structure with-
in a relatively short period of time. This development
compares favourably with observed results for most other
industrializing countries. Although the rapid expansion of
both manufactured and total exports (which account now for
1.02 percent of world exports, a.s compared with 0.45 percent
in 1959) was insufficient to close Spain's traditional trade
deficit, it is a significant achievement in itself because
it occurred in spite of a number of economic-policy distor-tions which could have negatively affected Spain's export
competitiveness.
In fact, the development strategies pursued during
the sixties and seventies, though more rational than the
preceding excessively inward-looking ones, have not been
optimal. On the contrary, there are still considerable
differences in the inter-industry pattern of incentives
and hence in the domestic resource cost of saving or
earning foreign exchange, thereby leading to inefficiencies
in the allocation of resources among economic activities.
As a consequence, the manufacturing industry (as well as
the agricultural sector) is excessively fragmented, many
industrial firms produce well below optimum scale, the
installed equipment is somewhat obsolete in a number of
branches, several companies operate with a negative value
added at world market prices, monopolistic and oligopolistic
market structures have emerged which involve significant
"X-inefficiencies" for given plant size and factor prices,
and only a few firms are known for applying modern organi-
zational techniques and for engaging in research (Lluch,
1974). Furthermore, there are still a number of high-cost
industries, including iron and steel, non-ferrous metals,
and industrial chemicals, which - because of their critical
position in the economy's input-output network - contribute
to the proliferation of defective cost structures over the
whole industry and inhibit other firms from becoming effi-
cient producers. It also is noteworthy, that Spain's
industry has not absorbed as much labour released from the
agricultural sector as required, thereby forcing an important
proportion of the labour force to emigrate to the EEC and
elsewhere.
The problems which the Spanish economy is facing have
been exacerbating in recent years. Not only was the country
negatively affected by the oil price explosion and the world_ 7 -
economic recession. The political change from Franco's
long-standing authoritarian corporate state towards a
representative democracy, initiated in December 1975, has
complicated even more the future growth. The successive
governments which have held office since Franco's death
have been more preoccupied with political issues (such as
the draft and implementation of a democratic constitution,
elections at the national and municipal levels, regional
demands for autonomy, continuing armed terrorism) than
with economic matters. Essentially, their economic actions
have been directed against what they regarded as the major
social injustices of the previous regimes. Equity issues
have taken precedence over efficiency considerations? in-
creasing levels of private and public consumption have
been given priority over the growth of net fixed investment.
In an atmosphere of deteriorating labour-management relations
with many strikes and lock-outs, money wages are rising
sharply and so does their share in national income, labour
productivity is declining rapidly, profitability of private
investment is falling markedly, and both risk capital and
entrepreneurial talents are emigrating to some extent.
All this has cast a damper on the booming economic
development, it has caused a number of companies (including
government-controlled ones) to go bankrupt, and it has led
to a decrease in the utilization of productive capacities
and an increase in the unemployment and underemployment
rates to levels hitherto unknown in the postwar period.
At the same tine inflation persists to a considerable
amount and has been exceeding the rates of the other OECP
The average annual rate of growth of real GDP was only 2
percent during the period 197 5-78. Real investment de-
creased, on average, by 1.4 percent. One fourth of industrial
productive capacities is not used, while the number of un-
employed people increased by 46.1 percent per annum,
especially affecting young people.countries with the exception of Iceland and Portugal.
Although Spain has developed a rather sound economic basis
from which the integration into the EEC can be pursued
without suffering unmanageable structural adjustment
difficulties, the need for a reversal of the recent trends
is inescapable if actual or potential international com-
petitiveness should not be reduced to almost nothing.
Potential Trade Effects of Integration
The EEC is one of the most important markets for
Spain's exports (absorbing about 46 percent) and one of
the main sources of supply of imported products (with a
share of about 34 percent). These shares, which incidental-
ly have been decreasing since the early sixties, are only
marginally lower than those of the EEC member countries in
their mutual trade (Alcaide, 1979, pp. 14sqq.). The import
structure shows a preponderance of capital goods, the
export structure one of foodstuffs. The balance of trade
with the ESC is negative. Provided that Spain does not pay
higher prices for goods imported from the Common Market
than for those available elsewhere, the trade deficits can
be considered to be a good indicator of benefits accruing
to the country from its trade relations with the EEC; they
reflect the extent to which the Community transfers re-
sources to Spain at world, market prices and to which a
rational division of labour is enhanced. Hence, much of
the concern in Spain about these trade deficits is rather
misplaced.
As far as trade in manufactures (excluding processed
food) between Spain and the EEC is concerned, it is note-
The austere stabilization measures introduced in October
19 77 under the so-called Moncloa Pact signed by the poli-
tical parties with parliamentary representation, after the
peseta was devalued by 31.2 percent in July, slowed down
the rise of the consumer price index in 1978 (to 19,7 per-
cent, as compared to 24.5 percent in 1977).- 9 -
worthy that Spain imports are dominated by chemicals and
machinery (SITC 5+7), which can be roughly regarded as re-
latively human capital-intensive goods; the other categories
of manufactured goods (SITC 6+8), which typically are more
labour-intensive, account for the overwhelming part of the
exports into the Community (Donges and Schatz, 1979, pp.22Osqq.).
Thus, Spain's trade in manufactures with the EEC seems to be
governed by patterns of comparative advantage. In recent
years, however, Spain has expanded exports of machinery and
chemicals into the EEC at higher rates than exports of other
manufactures. Hence, her trade structure has become more
similar to the EEC's foreign trade structure as time passed,
'thereby increasing the degree of intra- (as opposed to
inter-) industry specialization between the txtfo.
In order to better assess the evolution of international
competitiveness of Spain's tradable sector over time, it has
become common practice among economists to look at the re-
lative trade balance, or the relative export-to-import ratio,
of commodity groups, i.e. Balassa's "revealed comparative
advantages" (RCA). The basic assumption is that a country's
imports indicate which of the domestic industries are rela-
tively non-competitive, while these country's exports point
to the industries which display comparative competitiveness.
Hence, a positive trade balance represents a competitive ad-
vantage, a negative balance reflects a competitive disadvan-
tage in international trade. The higher the RCA index, the
The RCA index does not necessarily reflect real comparative
advantages. It is based on actual' trade figures which may
differ from those predicted by the theory of comparative ad-
vantage as a result, for instance, of distortions, originating
in protective measures against imports or in export incentives.
If Spain restricts imports of certain goods, the RCA index of
the industry in question might be based in an upward direction;
by the same token, it might look worse than it deserves if the
EEC or other countries impose barriers to Spanish exports. It
should also be noted that no allowance has been made for the
possibility of export price differentiation among countries of
destination, of product heterogeneity within individual industry
groupings, and of substantial differences in the absolute trade
values.- 10
more successful the industry's trade performance.
RCA indices have been calculated for 1961, 1970 and 1977,
distinguishing between the EEC and the rest of the world. The
ranking of 28 industrial commodity groups is shown in Table 2.
Spain's industry exhibits a strong competitive position in
footwear, leather manufactures, travel goods, wood and cork
manufactures, and clothing. Not surprisingly, these are all
labour- and/or raw material-intensive products, as are
textile yarn, metal manufactures, and miscellaneous articles,
which enjoy a small positive trade balance with both areas.
It is worthwhile, however, that Spain has been improving
international competitiveness in a number of more capital-
intensive goods falling into the "product-cycle-" category;
chemical fertilizers, plastic materials, rubber manufactures,
paper products, and transport equipment are cases in point.
There are some differences in ranking of RCA indices
between Spain's trade with the EEC and the rest of the
world, with a tendency to widen recently. Spearman's rank
correlation coefficients are 0.83 in 1961, 0.81 in 1970 and
0.63 in 1977 (all statistically significant at the 0.1 per-
cent level of confidence). Large disparities in favour of
trade with the EEC occur, for instance, in non-ferrous
metals, chemical elements, leather manufactures, wood and
cork products, and clothing. The competitive position of
Spain's industry is, on the other hand, much stronger in
trade with the rest of the world in, for example, non-
metallic mineral manufactures, plastic materials, sanitary
and heating apparatus, and rubber manufactures. As Spain's
trade with the non-EEC world includes trade with the over-
seas developing countries, which account for 60 percent of
this total, it is not surprising that the largest differ-
ences of RCA ranking in favour of this trade include capital-
intensive goods; it reflects the fact that Spain is relatively
well-endowed with physical capital and skilled labour in
comparison to these countries.- 11 -
Table 2 : Indices of 'Revealed Comparative Advantages'
8































Chemical elements and compounds
Mineral tar and crude chemicals from
coal, petroleum and natural gas
Dyeing, tanning and colouring products
Medical and pharmaceutical products
Essential oils and perfume materials
Manufactured fertilizers
Explosives and pyrotechnic products
Plastic materials, regenerated
cellulose & artificial resins
Other chemicals
Leather and leather manufactures
Rubber manufactures
Wood and cork manufactures (excl.
furniture)
Paper, paperboard and manufactures
thereof
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up






Electrical machinery, apparatus and
appliances
Transport equipment
Sanitary, plumbing, heating and
lighting fixtures and fittings
Furniture




Professional, scientific and control-
ling instruments; photographic and
optical goods; watches and clocks
Miscellaneous manufactures




































































, m. denote industry's i exports and imports, respectively


































































































































Sources: OECD, Statistics of Foreign Trade (Series C), various issues. - United Nations, Commodity
Trade Statistics, various issues. - Ministerio de Hacienda, Estadistica del Comercio
Exterior de EspaFla (C.U.C.I.), various issues.- 12 -
In all likelihood the mutual removal of tariffs after
the Agreement of Accession is signed holds the prospect of
some trade expansion for Spain, operating on the import side
as well as on the export side. The EEC average External
Common Tariff on dutiable non-agricultural imports stands
at 8.1 percent, whereas Spain's average tariff level lies
at 17.3 percent; of the reciprocal tariff reductions pro-
vided by the 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement are taken
into account, the nominal tariff averages become 3.7 and
12.7 percent, respectively (Puig et al., 1978, 88sqq.).
Despite these modest levels, scope for tariff liberalization
remains for two reasons; First, the tariff rates on a great
number of import items exceed the average level, especially
so in the case of Spain. Second, nominal tariffs rise with
the stage of processing, so that the effective rates of
tariff protection are considerably higher than the nominal
rates, particularly for durable consumer goods.
The extent of the expected trade-expanding effects
critically depends, apart from initial tariff levels and
sizes of total trade, on the price elasticities of supply
and demand. Since Spain accounts only for small proportions
of EEC's total manufactured exports and imports (about 2
percent each), it seems reasonable to regard the import
supply from, and the export demand of, the Community in her
trade with Spain as infinitively price elastic ("small
country" assumption). The industry-by-industry price
elasticities of Spanish import demand have been found to
range between -0.6 5 and -2.20, while the price elasticities
If Spain's exports into the EEC are disaggregated at branch
levels, the "small country assumption" might be less justi-
fied in the case of canned fruit and vegetables, beverages,
and footwear, which account for 7 to 9 percent of EEC's
imports.- 13 -
of Spain's export supply are in the neighbourhood of +0.02
to +1.75.
1
In quantifying the trade effects, 19 74 was chosen as
o
base year. The import effects may consist, on the one hand,
of "trade creation" (e.g. increased imports from low-cost
producers in the EEC at the expense of higher-cost Spanish
producers) and, on the other hand, of "trade diversion"
(e.g. substitution of imports from higher-cost producers
in the Community for imports from lower-cost producers in
non-SEC countries). Their amount is given in Table 3. The
increase of Spain's manufactured imports over actual 1974 .
imports would amount to $ 1 billion per annum or 11.1 per-j
cent. The three most important branches in the incremental
imports are machinery (30.1 percent), industrial chemicals
(13.7 percent), and electrical equipment (10.2 percent).
These are branches with high capital and technology inputs,
in which the competitive position of the Community is very
strong (as can be inferred from the RCA indices). The bulk
To obtain the price elasticities, Spain's import demand
and export supply functions have been estimated by (lagged
and non-lagged) OLS regressions for 23 manufacturing
branches, using annual data for the period 1960-77. Details
are available upon request. The estimates of import elastic-
ities are consistent with those obtained by Bonilla (1978)
for three aggregated groups of products, using quarterly
data for the years 1962-72.
Use of more recent years would have been abnormal in terms
of levels of economic activity as well as import and export
intensities of the Spanish industry.
The estimates compare the full integration situation with the
present one, thereby ignoring the transitional period (still
to be negotiated). Moreover, they are static in nature and do
not take into account either Keynesian multiplier effects or
changes in Spain's factor endowments and in the allocation
of resources which may result from the accession. Adjustments
in the exchange rates that would be required to compensate
for changes in the balance of trade brought about by liberal-
ization are also omitted. Finally, the calculation of "trade
diversion" traditionally rests upon the assumption that Spain's
production, her imports from the EEC, and those from third
countries, are equally substitutable, since disaggregated
estimates on substitution elasticities are not available.- 14 -
Table 3 : Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects of Spanish Trade Liberalization
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= initial Spanish imports from EEC 1974
= price elasticity of import demand
= the change in the Spanish import tariff rate
= the initial tariff level on imports from EEC
the Preferential Trade Agreement provisions
= Spanish imports from non-EEC countries
= domestic production






























































on imports fran EEC
reduced according
(1974).
Source: Basic trade data from UN, Campdity Trade Statistics, 1974. - Output data from UN, Yearbook of Industrial
Statistics, 1975. - Tariffs from Banco de Bilbao, Arancel de Aduanas 1960, 6th edition, Bilbao 1976. -
Trade data were reclassified from SITC into ISIC on the basis of the relationship established in UN,
Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 43 (1966), No. 4, Rev. 1+2 (1971). - Own estimates on price elasticities
of Spanish import demand (Table A-1).- 15
of the import expansion represents "trade creation" which
accounts for 35.2 percent of the total increase. There is
only one branch - petroleum and coal products - for which
"trade diversion" is larger than "trade creation
5', affecting
mainly suppliers from East European countries.
The estimated export effects are $ 155 million per
annum, i.e. 6.2 percent increases over 1974 levels (Table 4).
Processed food, beverages, and transport equipment would
account for almost the half of this incremental exports. The
first two are branches in which Spanish suppliers have been
displaying significant price and/or quality advantages over
the French and Italian ones. Free access to the Common Market
will enhance this competitive position. As to transport
equipment, the estimates are consistent with the ongoing
tendency to integrate Spain's automobile industry in the
vertical internationalization of car production, out of which
additional exports of parts and components as well as
finished passenger cars will emerge anyway.
As imports will increase faster than exports, Spain's
trade position vis-a-vis the EEC would worsen. These figures
should be taken only as rough indicators of what might happen,
rather than as exact orders of magnitude, since the estimates
of price elasticities of export supply are highly sensitive
to the choice of base years. Yet, it becomes obvious that the
integration will lead to a significant need for structural
adjustment within the Spanish industry. How heavy this burden
might be, depends on the timetable for the mutual tariff
removal. As it can be expected that the EEC's trade barriers
will be abolished more rapidly than the other way around,
Spain's manufacturers will initially be able to benefit from
a better access to the Common Market than the EEC producers
Various studies on the trade effects of the different pre-
ferential trade agreements between the EEC and Mediterranean
countries have led to similar results (Pomfret, 1976) .- 16 -
Table 4 : Expansionary Effects
8 on Spain's Manufactured






































































































IX. = t± Xi [1 + st (1 + ti)]
































initial Common External Tariff rate on Spanish exports.
price elasticity of export supply.
subscript for the three digit ISIC category.
Source: As Table 3. - Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Comercio Exterior
de Espana - Numeros Indices. Madrid 1976. - Idem,~Ahuario Estadistico
de Espana, 1978. - Own estimates on price elasticities of Spanish
export supply (Table A-1).- 17 -
will have to the Spanish market. The net trade impact will
therefore be less strong during the transition period than
Tables 3 and 4 suggest. Furthermore, while the impact of
increased imports on domestic output and employment will
be the smaller the more internal demand for the industry's
products will be increasing, the structural adjustment
process might also imply a strengthening of both the Spanish
industry and the non-tradable sector.
Potential Growth Effects
Turning now to dynamic aspects, both customs union
theory and practical experience within the EEC show that
mutual trade liberalization in the process of Spain's full
integration might stimulate economic growth through the
impetus to factor productivity and investment. A rise in
productivity can be due to increases in plant efficiency
forced by foreign competition and to large-scale economies
on a wider market. A quantification of the productivity
gains is beyond the scope of this paper, since detailed
empirical industry studies would have to be carried out.
But some general remarks, based on scattered information,
may support the view that those gains could be quite
substantial.
As has been mentioned earlier, the prevailing levels
of protection have created much "X-inefficiency" at the
firm level. Among the many high-cost producers there are
not only those who would not be able to compete with imports,
but also those who could actually compete - if it was a
matter of survival - by reducing costs. The latter firms
are simply not on their production possibility frontiers,
because their managers prefer a "quiet life" over profit
maximization, which is an attitude they can afford under
Mainly provided in industry analyses published in
Economia Industrial (Ministry of Industry).- 18 -
protection and in view of the fact that domestic competi-
tion does not function sufficiently well in Spain. Examples
can be found in all branches, but they are particularly
noteworthy in basic metals, shipbuilding, automobiles, and
textiles. State-owned companies tend also to perform poorly
in this regard. Increased import competition from the EEC
might present a challenge to the ability of management of
such firms to improve the organizational and technological
efficiency, to intensify the control of quality, and even
to develop and market new products. This will no doubt be
the case in the private sector and hopefully also in the
public sector. Increased "X-efficiency" might make the
trade effects of the accession more favourable for Spain,
since firms will appear as more competitive in their pro-
duction for both exports and import substitutes.
The economies-of-scale-hypothesis emerges from the
observation that Spain's industrial structure is dominated
by a large number of very small firmss about 80 percent
employed less than five people and 9 5 percent less than 50
people. Only a few of them have entered into product special-
ization and/or are complement to larger producers. According
to a report by the Ministry of Industry (1974), Spain's
largest firms (in terms of employment and value of output)
lag far behind the largest firms in the Community due to
their limited domestic market, though there are a few excep-
tions from this role in shipbuilding and construction. Even
in branches where empirical studies have shown economies of
scale to be very great, the leading Spanish firms (including
the foreign-controlled ones) in general do not have the
capacity size to take full advantage of scale economies.
The steel industry (suffering from proliferation and im-
balanced facilities in the sequence of production processes),
the heavy electrical equipment industry (with its largely
overlapping product lines), and the automobile industry
(displaying an excessive variety of passenger car makes) are
outstanding cases in point.19
Empirical estimates of production functions for the
Spanish manufacturing industry reveal that there is a large
economies of scale potential in many industries (Donges,
1972, pp. 598sqq.; Mendez, 1975, pp. 245sqq.). Moreover,
Mendez found unit costs decreasing substantially with size
of establishment for furniture, paper manufactures, printed
matter, rubber tires, paints and varnishes, perfumes and
soaps, plastic materials, glass products, and machinery.
The integration of the Spanish industry into the Community
would, by widening the market, facilitate the exploitation
of economies of scale in these industries. It would also
open opportunities for introducing large-scale production
in newly established plants, particularly in heavy mechan-
ical equipment where automation is making great headways in
Europe. Though the domestic market may not provide sufficient
outlet even at higher levels of per capita income, the
Common Market does; exports, then, contribute via linkages
to more efficient production for the national market on a
large scale, too. The widening of the market for Spanish
producers may also permit increased specialization (both
vertically and horizontally) on an optimum scale, for
instance in the paper industry, basic chemicals, railway
equipment, electrical engineering, automobile parts and
components, and scientific instruments. All this is subject
to the condition, that Spanish firms increase substantially
their expenditures on "research and development"; a less
fragmented industrial structure might help to bring about
such efforts.
As in the case of improved "X-efficiency", increased
realization of economies of scale should enhance the positive
trade effects for Spain. Those firms, in which the minimum
The R & D-to-GNP ratio (excluding expenditures for the ac-
quisition of foreign licenses and for technical assistance)
has been increasing since the mid-sixties, but is with 0.37
still one of the lowest in Europe (Rodriguez, 1977).- 20 -
long-run average costs exceed the world price by more than
the Common External Tariff, will decline or be even driven
out by import competition, thereby creating an adjustment
problem to the Spanish economy. The other existing, or
newly established, enterprises operating on downward-sloped
scale curves will be expanding by replacing imports and
increasing exports.
Improved "X-efficiency" and economies of scale might
have a parallel effect on the volume of investment. New
equipment will be needed in order to withstand foreign
competition, to achieve specialization and to increase
the scale of production. Furthermore, complete new plants
may be constructed in activities where Spain's comparative
advantage is particularly strong, reflecting also an inter-
industry reallocation of resources from lower- to higher-
productivity and skill requirements sectors. At the same
time, there will be disinvestment in the less efficient
firms; but this is unlikely to cause the overall investment
volume to fall or to only increase at modest rates, provided
appropriate government policies are pursued.
Apart from increased domestic savings, the inflow of
foreign capital might remain an important source of financ-
ing the expectedly growing investment in Spain. The country
has, in spite of its current economic problems, a promising
development potential; and the supply of labour (including
the relatively skilled one) is rather elastic at wages,
which are still among the lowest in Western Europe.
As Spanish legislation on foreign investment is very
2
liberal, firms from the advanced EEC countries could rega]
Spain even more than in the past as a natural location for
Both these variables explained a large share of the varia-
tion of direct foreign investment in Spain since 1960 (Donges,
1976, pp. 112sqq.).
2
The most recent expression of this attitude has been the
Royal Decree-Law No. 1388/78, promulgated .on June 23, 1978,
which removed the restrictions on the entry of foreign banks
into Spain.- 21 -
redeploying labour-intensive production; and companies from
non-EEC countries may want to use the opportunity for
exporting goods from Spain, free of tariff and non-tariff
barriers, to the Common Market. Increased foreign invest-
ment in Spain would not only enlarge the stock of technolog-
ical know-how in this country, but also be to a certain
degree a substitute for labour emigration from Spain to the
Community, thereby increasing the overall economic growth
rates in both parts, as Kiemenz and Schatz (1979) have shown.
In view of the current structure of foreign capital penetra-
tion into Spanish industrial sectors, Cordero (1978, pp. 65-66)
expects the following eight branches as being particularly
dependent in their future performance from the investment ,
decision of foreign companies? Transport equipment (especial-
ly motor-cars), electrical machinery, chemical industry, mis-
cellaneous manufactures, non-metallic mineral production,
non-electrical machinery, non-ferrous metals, and food pro-
cessing (in this order).
Implications for Policy Reform
To recapitulate, full membership in the EEC gives Spain
the opportunity to expand trade and accelerate economic
growth. Whether or not these opportunities materialize, lies
in the hands of Spanish government themselves, e.g. it
depends on the conduct of appropriate policies. To be sure,
the Spanish economy needs to be disentangled from the many
bureaucratic interferences to which it has been subject for
decades (Schwartz et al., 1979, pp. 1O9sqq.). Major areas
of concern are trade policies, industrial policies, competi-
tion policies, and labour market policies.
The recent decision of General Motors to establish a
factory in Spain has been justified, inter alia, in
these terms.- 22 -
Appropriate trade policies are of great importance
because they will critically determine the ability of
Spanish manufacturers to produce competitively import
substitutes and exportable goods. What is at stake anyway
in view of Spain's entry into the EEC is the reduction
of the existing levels of protection to harmonize them
with those of the Common External Tariff. This will make
present trade policies more rational. But the Government
will presumably face powerful vested interests of high-
cost producers demanding a long period of transition for
the tariff cuts. Assuming that these high costs are due
to comparative disadvantages, such demands should be re-
jected on the grounds that protection cannot by itself
transform the cost disadvantages into advantages. They
should also be rejected on the grounds that the postpone-
ment of the structural adjustment caused by the EEC integra-
tion will make the Spanish industry only more vulnerable
to future competition from the Community, that it is hard
to see how sheltered high-cost producers will be encouraged
to improve their methods of production and the quality of
their products, and that the maintenance of protective
measures (particularly quantitative import restrictions)
discriminates against exports which should become the
prime mover in Spain's future industrial growth. Thus, a
relatively short period of transition has considerable
advantages for the Spanish economy, though it may not be
an easy task for the Government to pursue an effective
policy of adjustment assistance in favour of trade-impacted
workers, firms and regions.
Under EEC regulations it will not be possible to reduce
or neutralize the discrimination against exports resulting
from protection by outright subsidies or tariff drawbacks
to exporters. What is possible, and would be advisable in
any case, is to provide export credits and export insurances
as well as assistance to the financing of trade fairs partic-
ipation to an extent comparable to actual arrangements in
the EEC.23
As to industrial policies, the government authorities
favour private initiative co-existing with public enter-
prises, but they still adhere to Francoist corporate state
philosophy that the control of the sectoral and geographical
allocation of manufacturing investments is in the national
interest. Consequently, the establishment, extension and
alteration of many industrial activities require prior
government authorization. This typically creates uncertainty
among applicants, involves substantial procedural delays,
channels resources of firms into the cultivation of good
relations to government officials rather than into effi-
ciency-raising efforts, and introduces some significant
misallocation into the patterns of industrial development,
which may impair the competitiveness of Spanish, firms in
the enlarged Common Market. A relaxation of regulatory
policies at the industry level seems therefore to be
required.
Industrial policies should also be reconsidered with
regard to the direct government control of industrial firms
through the National Industry Institute (INI). It was cre-
ated (in 1941) as an instrument of autarchic development
policy for promoting new enterprises defined as being in
the "national interest". In practice, however, the INI's
activities have been extending across the board, including
also the take-over of losing companies. As INI-controlled
enterprises receive a more favourable treatment than private
firms, investment by the latter is discouraged. Moreover,
the poor performance of many firms with INI participation,
Based on the sectoral share in annual volume of sales, INI-
controlled firms play a dominant role in mining (32 percent
in 1975), steel (44 percent), petroleum refining (40 percent),
shipbuilding (81 percent), and motor car industry (41 percent)
as compared to 20 percent in total industry.
Sources Ministerio de Industria (1978). It appears that the
share of publicly-controlled firms is in Spain, on average,
lower than in the United Kingdom, comparable to that in
France and Italy, and higher than in F.R. Germany.24
v.'hich is reflected in low profits or persistent losses,
casts many doubts upon the centralized manageability of
such a wide range of enterprises. Hence, INI sould con-
centrate on activities involving a high social rate of
return on invested capital, such as supporting research
and development in indigeneous industrial technology in
some areas, particularly machinery. On the other extreme,
it should divest itself of its ownership in such enter-
prises which do not require public support (any longer)
for being commercially viable? food processing, textiles,
automobiles, chemicals, and even electric utilities are
cases in point. The other companies, where INI's partic-
ipation is regarded by the Government as necessary (mainly
basic industries), should be allowed to operate more auto-
nomously, so that good and poor performers can be more
easily detected, thereby stimulating the management to
improve "X-efficiency" and to undertake process and
1
product innovations. The Italian experience with decen-
tralizing decision-making in the public sector (Institute
of Industrial Reconstruction) has much relevance for Spain.
At least as iraportant as these reforms to enhance the
competitiveness of Spanish industries in the enlarged
Common Market, is the strengthening of competition policies
in order to allow the market mechanism to direct resources
to their most efficient uses. Up to now Spanish legisla-
tion has been rather permissive towards restrictive business
practices. Therefore, it is most likely that Spanish firms
will attempt to form producer's cartels (or similar arrange-
ments). , arguing that this will ease their required restruc-
turing. However, cartelization would not be in the interest
of the Spanish society. Evidence abounds that the assurance
A financial reorganization of most of such enterprises
is required in the first place, however.- 25
of an acceptable rate of return on the existing capital
stock reduces the incentive of cartel members to under-
take productivity-raising investments. Thus the productiv-
ity gap between the Spanish and the EEC industry is bound
to widen in this case. There is, however, a good chance
that the gap can be narrowed if investment decisions are
allowed to be guided by changing relative prices.
Given the need of greater competition, the Government
may face a dilemma: while it is expected to promote mergers
of firms in order to achieve efficient sizes of plants,
this obviously involves the danger of generating monopoly
positions with unfavourable effects for the economy as a
whole. However, one important fact will ensure that such
positions do not materialize, namely the existence of in-
creased imports from the Community. A more concrete
appraisal can only be made on an industry-by-industry
basis, trading off economic costs and benefits of growing
concentration.
Labour policies should be directed to make factor
markets more flexible, thereby increasing inter-industry
labour mobility, allowing production to be reorganized,
and avoiding an excessive use of capital-intensive techno-
logies in production. At present, the labour regulations,
inherited from the Franco era, seem to operate in the
opposite direction; employees and workers are heavily pro-
tected against dismissal and they are entitled to severance
pays. Although the intent of such policies appears socially
justified, experience in many countries (including EEC
members) shows that they induce negative feedbacks; that
is they increase the real wage costs of labour (which is
in relatively large supply in Spain) without a corresponding
increase in productivity (Soltwedel and Spinanger, 1976).
This certainly would impair the international competitive-
ness of manufacturing production. While it may seem to run- 26 -
counter to the professional goals of social policies, a
relaxation of the job-tenure regulations seems to be
indispensable to help to adapt Spanish industry to the
changing international conditions. And at the same time
it would be also in the interest of Spanish labour force
itself, since the benefits from the present policy accrue
only to the pool of labour actually employed, while a
large and increasing number of job seekers, particularly
in the big cities and among the youth, are failing in
their attempt to find employment.
Having said the above, it is extremely important for
the Spanish Government to restore private business confidence
in Spain's future economic development. Only in this case
will productive investment increase again, so that over-
all growth can be accelerated and job opportunities
rapidly expanded. Otherwise negotiations with the EEC
could be protracted considerably, since the prevailing
unemployment in the Community will create much resistance
against the possibility of Spain to export her own unemploy-
ment through the (enlarged) common labour market.- 27 -


































































































































































































































Sources: As Tables 3 and 4.- 28 -
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